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Encoding context determines risky choice 46 
 47 
Abstract 48 
Both memory and choice are influenced by context: Memory is enhanced when encoding 49 
and retrieval contexts match, and choice is swayed by available options. Here, we 50 
assessed how context influences risky choice in an experience-based task in two main 51 
experiments (119 and 98 participants retained) and two additional experiments reported 52 
in the supplemental material (152 and 106 participants retained). Within a single session, 53 
we created two separate contexts by presenting blocks of trials in distinct backgrounds. 54 
Risky choices were context dependent; given the same choice, people chose differently 55 
depending on other outcomes experienced in that context. Choices reflected an 56 
overweighting of the most extreme outcomes within each local context, rather than the 57 
global context of all outcomes. When tested in the non-trained context, people chose 58 
according to the context at encoding and not retrieval. In subsequent memory tests, 59 
people displayed biases specific to distinct contexts: extreme outcomes from each context 60 
were more accessible and judged as more frequent. These results pose a challenge for 61 
theories of choice that rely on retrieval as guiding choice. 62 
Keywords: risky decision making; memory; decisions from experience; memory biases; 63 
behavioral economics; context; encoding 64 
 65 
Statement of Relevance 66 
People make risky choices in a variety of contexts, whether gambling at a casino, 67 
selecting a stock portfolio, or deciding which traffic-prone route to drive on the way 68 
home. The context determines the range of available options and outcomes, influencing 69 
what people choose. Context, such as location or time of day, also influences what people 70 
remember. Here, in a series of experiments, we assess how people make risky choices 71 
when they learn about the odds and outcomes from their own experience. We show that 72 
people select differently even between the exact same options, when those options appear 73 
in different contexts. Moreover, we show that people’s memories and risky choice 74 
depend on the context in which options are initially encountered, rather than the context 75 
at decision time. These results provide a novel demonstration of how memory for past 76 
outcomes influences choice with wide-reaching impacts for theories of memory and 77 
choice. 78 
79 
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Introduction 80 
People’s decisions are often informed by prior experiences, reflecting the 81 
influence of memory on decision making (e.g., Ludvig et al., 2015; Murty et al., 2016; 82 
Shohamy & Daw, 2015). Context has a large impact on memory (see Stark et al., 2018, 83 
for a review), leading, for example, to reduced recall when the location changes between 84 
study and test (Hupbach et al., 2007; Smith et al., 1978) and playing a prominent role in 85 
computational models of memory recall (Howard & Kahana, 2002). Context also 86 
significantly influences choice: other available options in a context can lead to range 87 
adaptation (Bavard et al., 2018) or even preference reversal in multi-attribute choice 88 
(Huber et al., 1982). Some theories have posited that choice is determined by context-89 
dependent samples drawn from memory (e.g., Stewart et al., 2006). Here we show that 90 
people choose differently between and remember differently about functionally identical 91 
pairs of risky options depending on the context. Moreover, we show that choice is 92 
determined by the set of available options present during encoding rather than at retrieval.  93 
Contextual information from the local environment can influence choices. For 94 
example, when French music is playing in a supermarket people buy more French than 95 
German wine and vice versa when German music is playing (North et al., 1999). 96 
Similarly, locating polling stations in a school nudges people toward support of school 97 
funding (Berger et al., 2008; Pryor et al., 2014). The local context provided by other 98 
available options can also influence choice (Huber et al., 1982; Simonson, 1989; 99 
Simonson & Tversky, 1992; Spektor et al., 2019). Consumer preference between two 100 
multidimensional products can reverse when a third “decoy” option is introduced that is 101 
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inferior along one dimension (e.g., cost or quality). Non-human animals also show 102 
similar local context effects in their choices (e.g., Shafir et al., 2012).  103 
Experience-based risky choices are also influenced by the set of available values 104 
in a decision context. When making decisions based on experience, people tend to be 105 
more risk seeking for relative gains than losses—the opposite of decisions made from 106 
explicit descriptions (e.g., Ludvig & Spetch, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 107 
Konstantinidis, et al., 2018; Wulff et al., 2018). This pattern of experienced-based risky 108 
choice appears to be driven by overweighting of the most extreme (best and worst) 109 
outcomes in the decision context (Ludvig et al., 2014, 2018). This effect of extremes was 110 
confirmed by including other options in the decision context that potentially led to higher 111 
(or lower) outcomes, thereby eliminating the bias in risky choice. Moreover, these biases 112 
in choice correlate with biases in memory for the extreme outcomes (Madan et al., 2014).  113 
People will sometimes even choose differently for identical decisions across 114 
experiments that have different ranges of possible outcomes, suggesting session-level 115 
context dependence (Ludvig et al., 2014; Stewart et al., 2015). For example, one decision 116 
in Ludvig et al. (2014) was between a fixed gain of 20 points and a risky option that had a 117 
50/50 chance of winning 40 points or nothing. People were more risk averse for this 118 
decision in an experiment that included other, larger wins (such that winning nothing was 119 
the worst possible outcome) than in an experiment that also included losses (such that 120 
winning 40 was the best possible outcome). These differences in risky choice for the 121 
exact same decision across experiments involving different decision sets implicate the 122 
context as an important determinant of risky choice.  123 
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Here we tested whether peoples’ choices shift with context changes even within a 124 
single experimental session and whether context-dependent effects on choice are based 125 
on the decision set present at encoding or retrieval. The main text reports two 126 
experiments and the supplementary material contains two additional experiments that 127 
replicate the main findings and refine what determines the decision context. 128 
 129 
EXPERIMENT 1: LOCAL DECISION CONTEXTS 130 
This experiment tested the stability of choice behavior by eliciting distinct decision 131 
contexts that alternated within a session. In memory research, discrete contexts are often 132 
elicited through distinct background images (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 1974; Ezzyat & 133 
Davachi, 2014). Inspired by this approach, the current experiment provided different 134 
contexts by alternating between blocks of decisions with distinct background images and 135 
choice options (Fig. 1). One choice (between a fixed gain of 20 points and a risky gain of 136 
10 or 30 points) was common to both contexts and served as the target choice. In the 137 
Gain/Loss context, other values were a fixed loss of 20 points and a risky loss of 10 or 30 138 
points. In the High/Low context, other values were a fixed gain of 60 points and a risky 139 
gain of 50 or 70 points. Thus, the target risky option provided the best possible outcome 140 
(+30) in the Gain/Loss context but the worst possible outcome (+10) in the High/Low 141 
context.   142 
If decision contexts create discrete sets of memories, then the extreme-outcome 143 
rule predicts that the best and worst outcomes in each local context will be overweighted 144 
in memory and choice (Ludvig et al., 2014). This overweighting would produce more risk 145 
seeking for the target choice in the Gain/Loss context than in the High/Low context (see 146 
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comparison outlined in orange/red in Figure 1). If people do not distinguish the contexts, 147 
risky choice should be identical in both cases, as the options yield the same values. In 148 
either case, we expected that people would show more risk seeking for the highest value 149 
decisions (+60 vs. +50/+70) and more risk aversion for the lowest value decisions (−20 150 
vs. −10/−30).  151 
 152 
 153 
Figure 1. Illustration of the options, outcomes, and context manipulations used in 154 
Experiment 1. The computer screen first presented the choice options (e.g., two 155 
doors) along with a background image. After the participant made their choice, the 156 
chosen door was replaced with an outcome image (e.g., robber or pot of gold), 157 
indicating the number of points won or lost following the outcome contingencies 158 
shown; the unchosen door was no longer shown. To differentiate between the four 159 
option pairs (losses, gains, low value, high value), different option images (distinct 160 
doors or distinct gift boxes) and different outcome images (i.e., robber, pot of gold, 161 
bag of money, and safe, respectively) were used. The target choices, outlined by the 162 
orange/red dashed line, had identical values in the two contexts.  163 
 164 
 165 
8 
 
 166 
Methods 167 
Participants 168 
A total of 128 participants (99 females; age [M±SD] = 19.4±1.9 years old) were recruited 169 
from the University of Alberta psychology participant pool. An additional 52 participants 170 
were recruited but were instructed and paid according to an incorrect payment scheme; as 171 
such their data was excluded and not analysed. Informed consent was obtained, and 172 
participants received course credit and a cash bonus for participating. They were 173 
instructed in groups of up to 15 but performed the task in individual rooms. The number 174 
recruited exceeded the number needed (97) to detect a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = 175 
0.4) with an alpha of .01 according to a power analysis for this within-subjects design. 176 
Procedures were approved by the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board.  177 
 178 
Procedure 179 
The experiment consisted of six blocks of trials. Blocks providing a ‘Gain/Loss’ context, 180 
indicated by an outdoor background image, alternated with blocks providing a 181 
‘High/Low’ context, indicated by an indoor background image (Fig. 1). Fixed options 182 
always led to the same outcome, whereas risky options provided two outcomes each with 183 
a 50% chance. In the Gain/Loss context, options were selected from four possible doors 184 
which led to either a fixed gain (+20), a risky gain (+10 or +30), a fixed loss (−20), or a 185 
risky loss (−10 or −30). In the High/Low context, options were selected from four 186 
possible gifts which led to either a fixed high-value gain (+60), a risky high-value gain 187 
(+50 or +70), a fixed low-value gain (+20), or a risky low-value gain (+10 or +30). As 188 
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such, there were four different option pairs in the experiment: gain, loss, high value, and 189 
low value. Critically, as highlighted by the orange dashed box in Figure 1, the target 190 
choices—gain options in the Gain/Loss context and low-value options in the High/Low 191 
context—led to identical outcome values, but their relative values within their respective 192 
contexts differed. Participants could only learn about the odds and outcomes by selecting 193 
the options.  194 
After a choice, the options disappeared, and feedback for the chosen option 195 
appeared for 1.2 s. Feedback consisted of the points earned or lost along with an outcome 196 
image. The order of the two contexts was counterbalanced across participants, as was the 197 
assignment of options to particular outcomes.  198 
For each context, prior to the first block of choice trials, participants were pre-199 
trained with 24 single-option trials to provide experience with the experimental 200 
procedure. For these trials, the outcomes associated with each risky option occurred 201 
equally often, preventing differences in initial experiences from influencing later choice 202 
(e.g., hot-stove or primacy effects; Denrell & March, 2001). Within this block, the gain or 203 
high-value options each appeared 8 times, whereas the loss or low-value options each 204 
appeared 4 times, such that participants ended the pre-training phase with a positive 205 
number of points in both contexts.  206 
Each block of choices consisted of 56 trials and included a mixture of trial types: 207 
There were 32 decision trials, which required a choice between fixed and risky options 208 
from the same option pairs (16 of each) and 16 catch trials, which required a choice 209 
between options from different option pairs with substantially different expected values 210 
(e.g., fixed gain vs. fixed loss). On 8 single-option trials, there was only one option that 211 
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had to be selected to continue; these trials guaranteed that all reward contingencies 212 
continued to be experienced, even if the options were initially unlucky, further limiting 213 
any hot-stove effects.  214 
In all blocks, trial order was randomized, and each option appeared equally often 215 
on either side of the screen. Performance of lower than 60% on catch trials in either 216 
context, across the whole experiment, was used as an exclusion criterion, following 217 
established protocol from previous experiments (Ludvig et al., 2014; Ludvig & Spetch, 218 
2011; Madan et al., 2014). Participants won or lost points on all trials and were paid $1 219 
for every 2000 points to a maximum of $5 (Canadian).  220 
After the choice task, memory for the outcomes associated with each option was 221 
tested in two ways. First, participants were shown the eight options in random order, and, 222 
for each option, were asked to report the first outcome that came to mind. Second, 223 
participants were again shown the eight options in random order and asked to judge the 224 
frequency in percent of each possible outcome (−30, −20, −10, +10, +20, +30, +50, +60, 225 
+70). For each option, these nine possible outcomes were displayed simultaneously, and 226 
participants typed a number from 0 to 100 below each respective outcome. For both 227 
memory tests, each option was presented against a uniform grey background on all trials. 228 
Stimuli and data from all experiments are available on the Open Science Framework at: 229 
https://osf.io/3mbwu/. All statistical results have been checked with statcheck (Epskamp 230 
& Nuijten, 2016). 231 
 232 
Analysis 233 
Data from 9 of the 128 participants were excluded from the analyses for scoring less than 234 
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60% on the catch trials, leaving 119 participants for the main analyses. The primary 235 
dependent measure was the proportion of risky choices in the final training blocks and in 236 
the test blocks. Two specific hypotheses were tested:  237 
1. The Decision-Context Hypothesis supposes that the extreme outcomes in each 238 
context will be overweighted. As a result, risky choice should be higher for the 239 
Gain/High-value options (with a high extreme) than for the Loss/Low-value options (with 240 
a low extreme) in the corresponding context. In addition, the target choice that has 241 
identical outcomes (i.e., Low or Gain, pending the context) should differ across the two 242 
contexts with more risk-seeking for that choice in the Gain/Loss context than in the 243 
High/Low context. These directional predictions were assessed through three one-tailed, 244 
paired t-tests. 245 
2. The Contextual-Memory Hypothesis supposes that, by the last block in each 246 
context, the extreme outcomes in each context will be more salient in memory. For the 247 
first-outcome-reported test, this hypothesis was assessed using four χ2 tests—one for each 248 
risky option. For the frequency-judgment tests, this hypothesis was assessed using four 249 
one-tailed paired t-tests, again one for each risky option. Based on prior work, we 250 
expected a robust effect for the Loss/Low-value risky option, but a milder effect with 251 
Gain/High-value options, because we have previously found memory biases to be weaker 252 
for Gains/High-value outcomes than for the Loss/Low-value outcomes (e.g., Madan et 253 
al., 2014, 2017).  254 
 255 
256 
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Results 257 
Risky choice 258 
Figure 2 shows the mean proportion of risky choice for each context and option pair. In 259 
the Gain/Loss context, participants were 10.6±6.6% [M±95%C.I.] more risk seeking for 260 
gains than losses [t(118)=3.15, p=.001, Cohen’s d=0.39]. In the High/Low context, 261 
participants were 15.9±6.6% more risk seeking for high-value than low-value options 262 
[t(118)=4.73, p<.001, d=0.54]. These results qualitatively replicate our previous findings 263 
on an extreme-outcome effect, including evidence for greater differences in risky choice 264 
for high- vs. low-value gains than for gains vs. losses (Ludvig et al., 2014; Madan et al., 265 
2014). 266 
Critically, when comparing choice in the two contexts, participants were 267 
11.3±6.3% more risk seeking for the target choices in the Gain/Loss context than in the 268 
High/Low context (i.e., comparison highlighted in Figure 1; orange/red bars in Figure 2), 269 
despite these options leading to the exact same outcome values [t(118)=3.52, p<.001, 270 
d=0.40]. Interestingly, the magnitude of the extreme-outcome effect in the final block of 271 
each context was uncorrelated between the two contexts [r(117)= −.04, p=.69], indicating 272 
that the two contexts had been learned relatively independently. Overall risk seeking 273 
collapsed across gains and losses, however, was correlated between the two contexts 274 
[r(117)=.45, p<.001]. 275 
Thus, participants’ biases in risky choice shifted as the visually distinct contexts 276 
alternated between blocks. The effect was sufficiently pronounced that even for the exact 277 
same target choice (between +20 and a 50/50 chance of +10 or +30), risky choice shifted 278 
by more than 10% even within the same participants within the same session, determined 279 
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by the decision context.  280 
 281 
Figure 2. Proportion of risky choices for each decision set and their respective 282 
decision context, averaged across the last block in each context for Experiment 1. 283 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 284 
 285 
 286 
Memory tests 287 
Figure 3 shows how both memory tests suggested some overweighting of the extreme 288 
outcomes, convergent with prior findings (Madan et al., 2014), as well as some context 289 
dependence in overweighting. The memory biases were more robust for the loss/low-290 
value decisions, also consistent with prior work. 291 
In the first-outcome-reported test, for both the loss and low-value options, 292 
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participants were significantly more likely to report the worse value (−30 and +10, 293 
respectively) [Loss: χ2(1,N=88)=35.64, p<.001; Low: χ2(1,N=92)=31.70, p<.001]. 294 
Participants did not exhibit a bias in their reported outcomes for gains [χ2(1,N=85)=0.11, 295 
p=.74], and there was only a weak trend toward responding with the better outcome for 296 
the high-value option [χ2(1,N=99)=2.92, p=.088]. Results were similar in the frequency-297 
judgment test, where people reported a significantly larger percent for the worse outcome 298 
for the loss and low-value options [Loss: t(102)=6.16, p<.001, d=1.06; Low: t(102)=7.02, 299 
p<.001, d=1.19], but did not report a reliable difference in judged percent for the 300 
outcomes of the gain and high-value options [Gain: t(102)=0.29, p=.39, d=0.05; High: 301 
t(102)=0.82, p=.21, d=0.14]. Thus, by both measures, the worst outcome in each context 302 
seemed to be particularly salient in memory. The context-dependence of this salience is 303 
highlighted by the +10 outcome which was reported more often and judged as having a 304 
higher frequency in the High/Low context than in the Gain/Loss context.  305 
  306 
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  307 
Figure 3. Results of the two memory tests for the risky options in the two decision 308 
contexts in Experiment 1. Participants were more likely to report the extreme 309 
outcomes first and judged the lowest outcome in each context as having occurred 310 
most frequently. Coloured bars are local extreme outcomes and white bars are non-311 
extremes. The colour code matches the conditions in Figure 1 (Blue = Loss; Orange 312 
= Gain; Red = Low; Green = High). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 313 
 314 
Discussion 315 
The context manipulation in this experiment successfully established distinct decision 316 
contexts. Participants made different risky choices even for option pairs that led to the 317 
exact same values; choices depended on the other values present in the same context, i.e., 318 
choices in the Gain and Low-value decisions (as highlighted in Figure 2). The memory 319 
tests also showed context dependence: people were more likely to report the extreme 320 
outcomes in each context as the first to come to mind and judged the worst outcome in 321 
each context as more frequent (see Fig. 3). Though we have previously demonstrated 322 
different risky choice for options leading to the same outcomes across experiments (e.g., 323 
Ludvig et al., 2014; Madan et al., 2014), this experiment is the first demonstration that 324 
risk preference for a given decision and related memory biases can differ across blocks of 325 
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trials within a single session, based on the local context. 326 
 327 
EXPERIMENT 2: ENCODING OR RETRIEVAL OF CONTEXTUAL CUES 328 
Here we sought to extend the findings of Experiment 1 by testing whether the context of 329 
encoding or retrieval is crucial for determining which outcomes are overweighted in 330 
memory and choice. The results of Experiment 1 could be due to processes operating at 331 
either encoding or retrieval. From an encoding perspective, outcome values might be 332 
encoded relative to the other values present in the context during learning (Rangel & 333 
Clithero, 2012). Values at the extremes of that set may be given more weight during 334 
encoding, causing them to be retrieved/sampled more readily when the option is later re-335 
experienced. An encoding account is also congruent with a selective-attention mechanism 336 
whereby goal-congruent items influence value integration (e.g., Kunar et al., 2017; Usher 337 
et al., 2019). 338 
Alternatively, context-dependent biases could be due to retrieval processes during 339 
choice. For example, if outcome values are encoded together with an association to their 340 
learning context, then the context present during choice may retrieve a memory of other 341 
values associated with that context. This retrieved set of values may determine the 342 
comparison set for evaluating values during choice (as in Decision by Sampling; Stewart 343 
et al., 2006), with extreme values being given most weight. A retrieval-based 344 
interpretation is consistent with findings that risky choice can be altered by presenting 345 
reminders of previous outcomes (Bornstein et al., 2017; Ludvig et al., 2015). 346 
To distinguish between encoding and retrieval hypotheses, we used the same 347 
design as Experiment 1, but with two modifications: (1) Choice stimuli and background 348 
17 
 
images were changed to make the target options more interchangeable. Specifically, we 349 
used eight distinct doors (rather than four doors and four gifts) as choice stimuli and two 350 
distinct street scenes as background images for the two decision contexts. (2) After the 351 
six choice blocks, we presented two blocks of probe tests without feedback, in which the 352 
doors providing the target choice were presented in either their training context (Same) or 353 
untrained context (Reversed).  354 
If the context of encoding is crucial, choices should be independent of the testing 355 
context. Participants should be more risk seeking for the target choices initially 356 
encountered in the Gain/Loss context than for those initially encountered in the 357 
High/Low value context, regardless of the test context. If the context of retrieval 358 
determines choice, however, then people should choose differently between the same 359 
pairs of doors in the two testing contexts. Specifically, participants should be more risk 360 
seeking for both target choices when tested in the Gain/Loss context than in the 361 
High/Low context. The design, hypotheses, analysis and expected choice results were 362 
pre-registered on the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/kv458/.  363 
 364 
Methods 365 
 366 
Participants 367 
  368 
A total of 103 participants (72 females; age [M±SD] = 20.8±3.4 years old) were drawn 369 
from the same participant pool, and recruitment and consent procedures were the same as 370 
in Experiment 1. Participants were paid $1 for every 200 points after the first 8000 earned 371 
up to a maximum of $5 (Canadian). 372 
 373 
374 
18 
 
Procedure 375 
General procedures were the same as in Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. The 376 
task consisted of 8 blocks. The first 6 blocks alternated between two contexts in which 4 377 
possible doors appeared alone or in pairs against a background outdoor scene that was 378 
unique to each context; these will be referred to as the training blocks. The last two 379 
blocks were test blocks, one for each context. In these blocks, choices were not followed 380 
by feedback. Prior to these two blocks, participants were informed by an instruction 381 
screen that they would not receive feedback for their choices, but that points would still 382 
be won or lost in the same way as before.  383 
Trials during the training blocks were identical to Experiment 1, except that all 384 
choice stimuli were doors, and the two backgrounds were distinct street scenes rather 385 
than an outdoor and indoor scene. In the test blocks, only the doors that led to the target 386 
choice of +20 versus a 50/50 chance of +10 or +30 appeared. These were tested in both 387 
contexts (order randomized across participants) without feedback. There were two test 388 
blocks of 16 trials each, providing a total of 8 trials with each target choice in each 389 
context.  390 
Following the test blocks, participants were given the same two types of memory 391 
tests (first outcome reported and frequency judgement) described in Experiment 1.  392 
 393 
Analysis 394 
Five participants were excluded from the analysis for scoring less than 60% on the catch 395 
trials, leaving 98 participants. As per our pre-registration, comparisons were evaluated 396 
with an alpha of .01. The primary dependent measure was the proportion of risky choices 397 
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in the final training blocks and in the test blocks. Four specific pre-registered hypotheses 398 
were tested:  399 
1. The Context-Replication Hypothesis, which supposes that by the end of training 400 
the extreme outcomes in each context will be overweighted, was assessed through three 401 
one-tailed paired t-tests. First, we tested the prediction that risky choice would be higher 402 
for the higher value option (high or gain) than for the lower value option (low or loss) in 403 
both contexts in the final block of the training phase. Second, we compared risky choice 404 
for the target choice in the two contexts. We predicted more risk-seeking for that choice 405 
in the Gain/Loss context than in the High/Low context.  406 
2. The Encoding Hypothesis supposes that the context effects are due to the way 407 
the doors were initially encoded in the training contexts. As a result, we predicted that, 408 
regardless of the test context, there would be more risk-seeking for the target choice 409 
learned in the Gain/Loss context than for the target choice learned in the High/Low 410 
context. This was assessed with two one-tailed paired t-tests, examining risky choice for 411 
the target choice in the two contexts during testing.  412 
3. The Retrieval Hypothesis supposes that the context effects are due to the 413 
context in which outcomes are retrieved at the time of choice. As a result, the test context 414 
should matter, and, for the target choice, people should be more risk-seeking when tested 415 
in the Gain/Loss context (where the other options were worse) than in the High/Low 416 
context (where the other options were better). This was assessed through a two-way 417 
(Training Context by Test Context) repeated-measures ANOVA. This hypothesis 418 
predicted a main effect of Test Context. 419 
20 
 
4. The Noise Hypothesis supposes that the context shift in the test blocks makes 420 
people behave more randomly as the discrepant context makes them rely less on their 421 
prior feedback. As a result, choice should shift toward indifference whenever doors are 422 
tested outside their training context. This hypothesis was tested by calculating the 423 
difference between each individual’s average absolute deviation from 50% in their risky 424 
choices in the two test contexts; a shift toward indifference with a context change should 425 
result in lower absolute deviation scores in the Reversed context. A one-tailed one-426 
sample t-test was used to test for reliable differences from 0 across the two contexts. 427 
Memory tests were analyzed in the same way as in Experiment 1. We did not 428 
preregister specific predictions for these tests.  429 
 430 
Results 431 
Risky choice 432 
Figure 4 shows the mean proportion of risky choices for each context and option pair 433 
during the last training block with each context. In the Gain/Loss context, participants 434 
were 13.8±7.6% [M±95%C.I.] more risk seeking for gains than losses [t(97)=3.62, 435 
p<.001, d=0.37]. In the High/Low context, participants were 24.1±8.3% more risk 436 
seeking for high-value than low-value choices [t(97)=5.72, p<.001, d=0.58]. These 437 
results qualitatively replicate results from Experiment 1. 438 
Critically, when comparing the two contexts, participants were 22.7±7.9% more 439 
risk seeking for the target choice in the Gain/Loss context than in the High/Low context 440 
[t(97)=5.68, p<.001, d=0.57]. The magnitude of the extreme-outcome effect was again 441 
uncorrelated between the two contexts [r(97)= .037, p=.72], indicating that the two 442 
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contexts were learned relatively independently. Overall risk seeking (collapsing across all 443 
risky decisions) was slightly, but not significantly, correlated between the two contexts 444 
[r(97)=.191, p=.058]. 445 
 446 
Figure 4. Proportion of risky choices for each of the four option pairs separated by 447 
their respective decision contexts and averaged across the last block in each context 448 
for Experiment 2. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 449 
 450 
Test blocks 451 
Figure 5 shows the mean risky choice for the target choices when they were presented 452 
without feedback during testing. The test context had no discernable effect. When tested 453 
in the Same context, participants were 22.2±9.8% more risk seeking for the target choice 454 
trained in the Gain/Loss context than in the High/Low context [t(97)=4.50, p<.001, 455 
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d=0.46]. Similarly, when tested in the Reversed context, participants were 22.5±10.0% 456 
more risk seeking for the target choice trained in the Gain/Loss context than in the 457 
High/Low context [t(97)=4.48, p<.001, d=.45]. A two-way ANOVA confirmed a main 458 
effect of Choice [F(1,97)=21.1, p<.001, ηp
2=.18], but no effect of Test Context 459 
[F(1,97)=0.51, p=.48, ηp
2=.005] and no interaction [F(1,97)=0.015, p=.90, ηp
2=.00].  460 
There was no evidence in support of the noise hypothesis: The average deviation from 461 
indifference (0.5) did not differ for risky choices conducted in the Same context 462 
[35.7±3.0%] from the risky choices conducted in the Reversed context [36.0±2.8%; 463 
t(97)=0.28, p=.78, d=0.03]. These data support the notion that the encoding context is 464 
more important than the retrieval context in determining later choice. 465 
 466 
 467 
 468 
Figure 5. Results of the probe choice tests in Experiment 2. Proportion of risky 469 
choices for the target choice (+20 vs +10/+30) trained in the Gain/Loss context or the 470 
High/Low context when tested without feedback in the Same or Reversed context.   471 
 472 
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In an additional exploratory analysis, we sought to solidify the argument 473 
for/against the encoding/retrieval hypotheses, respectively. Here we tested whether risky 474 
choices in different conditions of the test blocks were independent. The Encoding 475 
Hypothesis predicts that the proportion of risky choices for gain and low-value decisions 476 
should be highly correlated between the Same and Reversed contexts because the choices 477 
should be invariant to test context. In addition, the Encoding hypothesis predicts low 478 
correlations between risky choices for gain and low-value option pairs within each test 479 
context, as these would have been encountered independently in training. In contrast, the 480 
Retrieval Hypothesis predicts the opposite: low correlations for each option pair across 481 
test contexts, but high correlations between the gain and low-value decisions within a 482 
context. 483 
Figure 6 shows how these results strongly support the Encoding Hypothesis: 484 
Correlations were very strong when comparing the proportion of risky choices made for 485 
the gain decisions in the Same or Reversed test context [r(97)=.901, p<.001] and 486 
similarly high for the low-value decisions [r(97)=.920, p<.001]. In contrast, correlations 487 
between risky choices for gain and low-value decisions within each context were very 488 
low, suggesting that these decisions were independent of each other despite having 489 
identical outcome values [Same context: r(97)=.014, p=.89; Reversed context: 490 
r(97)=.002, p=.99]. 491 
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 492 
Figure 6. Proportion of risky choices made in the test blocks for (A) gain decisions 493 
and (B) low-value decisions, between Same and Reversed contexts. The opposite 494 
comparison is shown in the next panels, with the proportion of risky choices in the 495 
(C) Same context and (D) Reversed context, between gain and low-value decisions. 496 
Each dot represents an individual participant; dot locations are jittered to reduce 497 
overlap. 498 
 499 
Memory tests  500 
Figure 7 shows the results of the memory tests were similar to those seen in Experiment 501 
1, with context-dependent overweighting of the extreme loss and low-value outcomes. In 502 
the first-outcome-reported test, for both the loss and low-value options, participants were 503 
significantly more likely to report the worse value (−30 and +10, respectively) [Loss: 504 
χ2(1,N=71)=8.80, p=.003; Low: χ2(1,N=76)=23.21, p<.001]. Differences in reporting of 505 
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outcomes were not significant for the risky gains [χ2(1,N=76)=1.90, p=.17], nor for the 506 
risky high-value option [χ2(1,N=78)=2.51, p=.11]. The frequency-judgment test also 507 
showed a context-dependent bias in which people reported higher percentages for the 508 
worse outcome for the loss and low-value options [Loss: t(93)=5.10, p<.001, d=0.526; 509 
Low: t(90)=6.19, p<.001, d=.65], but no reliable difference in judged percent for the 510 
outcomes of the gain and high-value options [Gain: t(92)=0.07, p=.948, d=0.01; High: 511 
t(91)=0.58, p=.56, d=0.06]. Thus, by both measures, the worst outcome in each context 512 
was particularly salient in memory. The context dependence of this salience is 513 
highlighted by the +10 outcome which was reported more often [χ2(1,N=91)=8.01, 514 
p=.005] and judged as having a higher frequency (t(88)=4.07, p<.001, d=0.43) in the 515 
High/Low context (where it was the worst outcome) than in the Gain/Loss context (where 516 
it was an intermediate outcome).  517 
 518 
Figure 7. Results of the two memory tests for each decision context in Experiment 2. 519 
Participants were more likely to report the extreme outcomes first and judged the 520 
lowest outcome in each context as having occurred most frequently. Coloured bars 521 
are local extreme outcomes and white bars are non-extremes. The colour code 522 
matches the conditions in previous figures (Blue = Loss; Orange = Gain; Red = 523 
Low; Green = High). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 524 
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 525 
Supplemental experiments 526 
Two additional experiments are reported in the Supplemental Material that address 527 
alternative explanations related to the necessary and sufficient conditions for creating 528 
distinct decision contexts (see Table S1). The results show that distinct background 529 
images are not necessary for establishing a local decision context, but temporal grouping 530 
of the choices is not sufficient to discretize the contexts. The distinct visual cues from the 531 
choice stimuli, however, are sufficient, and may even be necessary, to distinguish the 532 
contexts (see Exp. S2). These distinct visual cues may also serve as retrieval cues for the 533 
decision context in which they were encoded. Together with Exp. 2, these results clearly 534 
show that choice is determined by the decision context during encoding, and not the 535 
decision context at retrieval.   536 
 537 
General Discussion 538 
Here, in two experiments, we demonstrated that people’s risky choices are not stable, 539 
even within a single experimental session, but rather depend on the other outcomes 540 
experienced during the context of encoding. Risky choice was biased by the most 541 
extreme outcomes in a particular decision context, rather than the global context of the 542 
whole experiment, and people also remembered those outcomes more strongly. Even for 543 
the exact same decisions (between +20 and a 50/50 chance of +10 or +30), changes in 544 
context substantially shifted both risky choice (>10% in Exp. 1 and >20% in Exp. 2) and 545 
memory for extremes, even for the same participants within a single session. Moreover, 546 
when tested in the opposite context, people chose in line with the initial training context, 547 
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suggesting that the context of encoding is critical for this memory-based choice.  548 
These findings have theoretical implications for memory-based theories of 549 
experience-based decision making (e.g., Shohamy & Daw, 2015; Weber & Johnson, 550 
2006). For example, according to Decision by Sampling Theory (Stewart et al., 2006), the 551 
values of options presented at choice are compared to a small sample in working 552 
memory; the sample comes both from other values in the immediate context and from 553 
values stored in long-term memory. Our results suggest that such samples would have to 554 
come from values presented in the encoding context rather than in the context at the time 555 
of choice. Thus, our results pose significant challenges for retrieval-based models of how 556 
memory affects choice, but are more consistent with a recent reinforcement-learning (RL) 557 
model that assumes that the influence of context on value operates during the learning 558 
process (Spektor et al., 2019).  559 
The current results show how unstable choices can be and add to the growing 560 
evidence that choices depend on properties of the decision context (e.g., Huber et al., 561 
1982; Simonson & Tversky, 1992). An important open question is how to pull the various 562 
context effects into a single process model of risky choice. One possibility is inspired by 563 
recent RL models that have attempted to integrate aspects of episodic memory (e.g., 564 
Gershman & Daw, 2017). Exactly how to incorporate other context effects from the 565 
decision-making literature is not clear, but may require real-time integration mechanisms 566 
as in decision-field theory or the drift-diffusion model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Roe et 567 
al., 2001). Our work, however, suggests how important modeling context effects will be 568 
for creating a reliable model of human decision-making when learning from experience.  569 
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Supplemental Materials for: Encoding Context Determines Risky Choice 673 
 674 
OVERVIEW 675 
These supplemental materials present two additional experiments that replicate and 676 
extend the two experiments presented in the main text. Both supplemental experiments 677 
dispense with the use of background images to distinguish the contexts. Table S1 678 
summarizes the methodological details and key results. Exp. S1 recreates Exp. 1 from the 679 
main text, except omits the background images and does not have distinct doors to 680 
represent the options with the same outcomes. The results show that some visual 681 
distinctiveness is necessary to create separate contexts, and temporal grouping alone is 682 
not sufficient. Exp. S2 replicates Exp. 2 from the main text, except omitting the 683 
background images; the doors, however, are visually different in the two contexts. In 684 
addition, the post-training test trials were different and placed the two sets of target 685 
choices (i.e., gains and low-value option pairs) in the same temporal context. Results 686 
exactly match the key results for Exp. 2, with local context driving the overweighting of 687 
extremes in memory and choice, and the effect being driven by the context at encoding. 688 
 As shown in Table S1, all experiments included the temporal grouping of 689 
alternating blocks of two option pairs during training. As such, based solely on the 690 
underlying temporal structure of all experiments (i.e., ignoring the visual features), all 691 
four experiments are identical. Exp. 1 and 2 had distinct backgrounds that served as 692 
visual signals for the current decision context. Exp. 1, 2, and S2 used distinct choice 693 
stimuli that could also visually signal the current context. These three experiments all 694 
demonstrated that the range of values experienced within a block dictated choice, 695 
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indicating that decision contexts were functionally distinct—which we refer to in Table 696 
S1 as evidence of a local decision context. Removing both the background images and 697 
the distinct choice stimuli, while still retaining temporal groupings of trial types, 698 
eliminated the effects of local decision context on choice, and led to behavior consistent 699 
with a global decision context.  700 
Additionally, both Exp. 2 and S2 included test blocks at the end, where the choice 701 
stimuli (doors) were presented in new contexts, either by using a mismatched background 702 
image (Exp. 2) or by presenting choices involving a mix of doors used for the Gain and 703 
Low-value option pairs (Exp. S2). In both cases, choices were congruent with the risky 704 
choices during training, suggesting that people made choices according to the encoding 705 
context, rather than retrieval context. 706 
 707 
Table S1. Details of methodology and primary results from the two main and two 708 
supplemental experiments. 709 
 Exp. 1  Exp. 2  Exp. S1 Exp. S2 
Method:     
     Background Images √ √ × × 
     Temporal Grouping √ √ √ √ 
     Distinct Choice Stimuli √ √ × √ 
Results:     
     Global/Local L L G L 
     Encoding/Retrieval - E - E 
 710 
  711 
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EXPERIMENT S1: NECCESSITY OF DISTINCT VISUAL CUES 712 
The context effects seen in Experiment 1 clearly indicated that participants were able to 713 
segregate contexts that were visually distinct (different background cues and visually 714 
distinct choice options) and temporally segregated by alternating blocks of decision sets. 715 
This experiment tested whether participants also discretize contexts based on the 716 
temporal structure of the blocks alone.  717 
Methods 718 
Participants 719 
A total of 155 participants (109 females; age [M±SD] = 19.3±2.4 years old) were drawn 720 
from the same participant pool at the University of Alberta, and all recruitment, consent, 721 
and payment procedures were the same as in Experiment 1. 722 
Procedure 723 
The structure of the experiment was identical to that in Experiment 1, but there 724 
were no visual cues to differentiate between the two choice contexts. Instead all choices 725 
were presented against a uniform gray background. Moreover, all choice stimuli were 726 
doors, and the same two target doors served as the gain doors in the gain/loss context and 727 
the low-value doors in the high/low context. The number and composition of trials in 728 
each block, and the procedural details of each trial were the same as in Experiment 1. 729 
Three participants were excluded because they scored less than 60% on the catch trials, 730 
leaving 152 participants for the main analyses. After the last block of choice trials, recall 731 
and frequency memory tests were conducted with the six doors.  732 
 733 
 734 
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Results 735 
Risky choice 736 
Figure S1 shows the mean proportion of risky choices for each option pair. In the blocks 737 
with gain and loss choices, participants were only 0.2±4.6% [M±95%C.I.] more risk 738 
seeking for gains than losses [t(151)=0.09, p=.93, Cohen’s d=0.01]. In the blocks with 739 
high and low-value gains, however, participants were 13.5±5.3% more risk seeking for 740 
high-value than low-value options [t(151)=5.08, p<.001, d=0.41].  741 
Critically, risky choices for the target decisions (+20 versus +10/+30) were only 742 
1.8±2.5% higher on Gain/Loss blocks than on High/Low blocks [t(151)=1.37, p=.17, 743 
d=0.11].   744 
 745 
Figure S1. Proportion of risky choices for each option pair and their respective 746 
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decision context, averaged across the last block in each context for Experiment S1. 747 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 748 
 749 
Memory tests 750 
For the recall tests, participants were more likely to report the lowest value for the risky 751 
loss door and for the risky target door and to report the higher outcome for the risky high-752 
value door [χ2(1)= 26.1, 7.81, and 96.6, all ps <.01], as shown in Figure S2. In the 753 
frequency-judgment test, participants reported that the lower-valued outcome occurred 754 
more often for the risky loss door [t(142)=6.49, p<.001, d=0.54] and for the risky target 755 
door [t(142)=4.72, p<.001, d=0.40], but there were no reliable differences in judged 756 
percent of the two outcomes for the high-value risky door [t(146)=0.09, p=.93, d=0.01].  757 
 758 
Figure S2. Results of the two memory tests for each decision in Experiment S1. 759 
Coloured bars are global extreme outcomes and white bars are non-extremes. The 760 
colour code matches the conditions in previous figures (Blue = Loss; Green = High). 761 
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Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 762 
 763 
 764 
Discussion 765 
The alternating block structure of the two decision sets was not sufficient to induce a 766 
local context for choice when no visual cues indicated the change in context. In 767 
particular, unlike in Experiment 1, risky choice on the target choices did not differ 768 
depending on whether they were presented in blocks with losses or in blocks with higher 769 
value gains. Thus, visually distinguishing the contexts, either by choice stimuli or 770 
background effects seems necessary for these context-dependent biases.  771 
 772 
EXPERIMENT S2: ROLE OF BACKGROUND IN DETERMINING CONTEXT 773 
Experiment S1 showed that the alternation of decision sets, without any distinctive cues 774 
to signal the context change, was not sufficient for discretization of the contexts. Here we 775 
removed the distinct background cues as in Experiment S1 but provided visually distinct 776 
choice options for the target decisions in the two decision contexts.   777 
 If visually-distinct but functionally identical choice options acquired different 778 
values as a result of grouping with other options, risk preference should show local 779 
context effects as seen in Experiments 1 and 2. If, however, the background image is 780 
required to segregate the contexts, then risk preferences for the target decisions should 781 
not differ between contexts. As in Experiment 2, probe tests were conducted in an altered 782 
context to assess whether biases were based on encoding or retrieval. 783 
The sample size, methods, hypotheses, and analyses for the experiment were 784 
preregistered on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/gt4rc/).  785 
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 786 
Methods 787 
Participants 788 
A total of 106 participants (71 female; age [M±SD] = 25.1±4.9 years old) from the 789 
University of Warwick were recruited using the SONA online sign-up system and 790 
provided informed consent. Participants were paid an honorarium of £4 (UK pounds) 791 
along with a cash bonus for participating. Participants were paid £1 for every 200 points 792 
after the first 8000 points earned, up to a maximum bonus of £3. Participants were 793 
instructed in groups of up to 12. All participants scored more than 60% overall on the 794 
catch trials and were retained in the main analysis. Procedures were approved by the 795 
Warwick Psychology Research Ethics Committee.  796 
 797 
Procedure 798 
The experimental design was similar to Experiment 2, except that for all blocks, choice 799 
stimuli were presented against a uniform white background, rather than distinct images. 800 
Door images always appeared on a white background screen (Figure S3) and clicking a 801 
door led to feedback (points awarded or deducted) for one second before a button saying 802 
NEXT appeared. Pressing the “Next” button started an inter-trial interval which varied 803 
randomly from one to two seconds and provided a uniform white screen. The 804 
accumulated points were shown at the end of each block rather than at the end of each 805 
trial. 806 
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 807 
Figure S3. Choice stimuli used in Experiment S2. (A) Set of options in Context A 808 
(Gain/Loss) and Context B (High/Low) in the training phase. (B) Set of options in 809 
Context C and Context D in the test phase. The association between door and 810 
outcome was randomized across participants but remained constant within 811 
participants. Note that there were no distinct visual stimuli indicating the contexts 812 
apart from the doors/options themselves. 813 
 814 
The eight visually distinct doors were randomly associated with the set of 815 
outcomes shown in Figure S1, but the assignment was constant for a given individual. As 816 
in Experiment 2, the training phase contained 6 blocks with alternating decision sets. The 817 
first two blocks of the training phase had 56 trials consisting of 32 decision trials, 16 818 
catch trials, and 8 single-choice trials. The following 4 blocks of the training phase had 819 
48 trials and had the same structure except that there were no single-choice trials.   820 
Training was followed by two blocks of test trials, each with 32 trials. In the test 821 
phase, the contexts were switched as illustrated in Figure S3 by changing which decisions 822 
were present in which context. Context C contained choices between the fixed gain (+20) 823 
and the risky gain (+10 or +30) and between the fixed low-value (+20), and the risky 824 
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low-value (+10 or +30) options1. Context D contained choices between the fixed loss (-825 
20) against the risky loss (-30 or -10) and between the fixed high-value (+60) and the 826 
risky high-value (+50 or +70) options. Each context consisted of one block of 32 trials 827 
(16 trials of each choice). Participants did not receive feedback after their selections in 828 
the test trials, but they were informed that the outcomes of their choices would continue 829 
to contribute to their accumulated bonuses.   830 
After the choice task, participants completed two memory tests that were the same 831 
as in Experiments 1 and 2 with the following exceptions. For the recall test, they had to 832 
select a bullet option to indicated whether the outcome was positive or negative in 833 
addition to typing the value of the recalled outcome. An error message appeared if a 834 
bullet option was not selected or a non-numeric character was typed. 835 
For the frequency-judgement test, each door image was shown together with a 836 
3x3 matrix consisting of all outcomes from the experiment in ascending order. Each 837 
outcome value was paired with a blank space where participants reported their answers. 838 
Participants were instructed to type the judged percent frequency of each outcome for the 839 
displayed door image, and they were advised that all blank spaces would be considered as 840 
zero. The task only continued if the sum of their responses for a given door totaled to 841 
100. 842 
Hypotheses and Preregistered Data Analysis 843 
As stated in the preregistration, the main hypotheses were: 844 
 
1 This design differed from the pre-registered plan which was to put the high-value and gain options in one 
context and the low-value and loss options in a second context (a full cross-over). Instead, the gain and 
low-value options (which have the same values) were placed in the same context. This altered design still 
allows testing of the core hypotheses, but is perhaps a less stringent test than initially planned. The 
hypotheses were adjusted slightly from the pre-registration to account for this shifted design, but the same, 
planned statistical tests were run. 
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  1. The Context-Replication Hypothesis predicts that extreme outcomes in each 845 
context would be overweighted, leading to greater risky choice for the highest value 846 
options in each context. This hypothesis was assessed through one-tailed paired t-tests on 847 
risky choice for the higher value and lower value options during the final block of the 848 
training trials in each context. Risky choice for the target choice (+20 vs. +10/+30) in the 849 
two contexts was also compared. This hypothesis predicts more risk-seeking in Context 850 
A (where the target was the higher value choice in the set) than in Context B (where the 851 
target was the lower value choice in the set). 852 
2. The Encoding Hypothesis predicts that context effects on choice are based on 853 
the encoding context of each option. As a result, the pattern of choice in the test phase 854 
should be the same as the pattern in the last block of the training phase for the same 855 
decision sets. This was assessed with the same 3 one-tailed paired t-tests on choices 856 
during the test phase. 857 
3. The Retrieval Hypothesis supposes that context effects on choice are based on 858 
the retrieval context at the time of choice. As a result, the pattern of choice in the test 859 
phase (which presents options in a different context from training), should differ from the 860 
pattern of choice seen at the end of the training phase. Specifically, people should be less 861 
risk-seeking for the gain choice and more risk-seeking for the low-value choice during 862 
testing (with similar levels for both choices). This prediction was assessed with a two-863 
way repeated-measures ANOVA (Choice [Gain vs. Low value] by Context [Training vs. 864 
Test]), with a predicted interaction between the two variables. Contrary to the encoding 865 
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hypothesis (above), the retrieval hypothesis predicts no reliable difference between gain 866 
and low-value choices, when they were both tested in the same context (i.e., Context C)2. 867 
4. The Noise Hypothesis supposes that a context shift will lead to more random 868 
choices. As a result, choice should shift toward indifference whenever doors are tested 869 
outside their training context (i.e., Context C and Context D). This was tested by 870 
calculating, for each participant, whether risky choice was closer to 50% in the novel 871 
context than at the end of training. A one-sample t-test was employed to test for reliable 872 
differences from 0%. 873 
 874 
Results 875 
Risky choice 876 
Figure S4 shows risky choice for the higher and lower-value options in the four contexts. 877 
In the Gain/Loss context, participants were on average 8.7±6.4% [M±95%C.I.] more risk 878 
seeking for gains than for losses [t(105)=2.65, p=.005, d=0.29]. In the High/Low context, 879 
participants were 14.6±6.2% more risk-seeking for the high-value than for the low-value 880 
decision [t(105)=4.60, p<.001, d=0.46]. 881 
As in Exp 1 and Exp 2 in the main text, participants demonstrated significantly 882 
different risk preferences for the target choices in the two contexts. Participants were 883 
9.8±6.1% more risk-seeking for the target choice in the Gain/Loss context than in the 884 
High/Low context [t(105)=3.15, p=.001, d=0.33], as highlighted in Figure S4. These 885 
results replicate the context effects seen in Exp. 1 and Exp. 2 and reveal that participants 886 
 
2 The pre-registration incorrectly states that the main effect of “Context” could be used to evaluate this 
hypothesis when this main effect actually indicates a shift in overall risk preference from training to test. It 
is the interaction between “Context” and “Choice” that could provide support for the Retrieval Hypothesis.  
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can discretize distinct decision contexts even without a background image to cue the 887 
context change. 888 
 889 
 890 
Figure S4. Proportion of risky choices for each decision set and their respective 891 
decision context, averaged across the last block in each context for Experiment S2. 892 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 893 
 894 
Test blocks 895 
During the test phase, the options were intermixed, and participants completed the choice 896 
task without feedback. Figure S4 shows how, for the choices trained in the Gain/Loss 897 
context, participants were still 8.5±7.9% more risk seeking for gains than for losses 898 
[t(105)=2.14, p=.017, d=0.25]. For the choices trained in the High/Low context, 899 
participants were still 14.4±7.6% more risk-seeking for the high-value gamble than for 900 
the low-value gamble [t(105)=3.69, p<.001, d=0.46]. The two target choices both 901 
appeared in Context C, yet people choose differently for each pairing despite their 902 
outcome equivalence. Similar to the training phase, they were 10.3±6.1% more risk-903 
seeking for the target choice trained in the gain/loss context than for the target choice 904 
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trained in the high/low value context [t(105)=3.32, p<.001, d=0.31]. These results 905 
support the Encoding Hypothesis and are inconsistent with the Retrieval Hypothesis. A 906 
two-way ANOVA confirmed a main effect of Choice [F(1,105)=14.3, p<.001, ηp
2=.12], 907 
an effect of Context [F(1,105)=34.6, p<.001, ηp
2=.25] whereby people were more risk 908 
averse overall during the test context, and no interaction [F(1,105)=0.015, p=.90, 909 
ηp
2=.00]. These data support the notion that the encoding context is more important than 910 
the retrieval context in determining choice. 911 
We further examined if participants’ average risky choices in the test phase 912 
tended towards indifference. At the individual-choice level, for the gain target choices, 913 
people were on average of 8.4±3.2% further from indifference during the test 914 
[t(105)=4.01, p<.001, d=0.39], and for the low-value target choices, people were 915 
6.6±3.2% further from indifference [t(105)=5.22, p<.001, d=0.51]. These results firmly 916 
invalidate the noise hypothesis. 917 
Memory tests 918 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the average responses for the first outcome 919 
reported for each option. The results show context-dependent overweighting of the 920 
extreme loss and low-value outcomes. In the first-outcome-reported test, for both the loss 921 
and low-value options, participants were significantly more likely to report the worse 922 
value (−30 and +10, respectively) [Loss: χ2(1,N=93)=23.75, p<.001; Low: 923 
χ2(1,N=77)=19.75, p<.001]. The difference in reporting of outcomes was not significant 924 
for the gain option [χ2(1,N=79)=0.013, p=.91], but for the high-value option, the upper 925 
extreme (+70) was moderately more likely to be reported than the non-extreme high-926 
value outcome (+50) [𝜒2(1, N=98)=4.94, p=.03].  927 
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Error! Reference source not found. also illustrates participants’ mean judged 928 
frequencies for each option. The frequency-judgment test also showed a context-929 
dependent bias in which people reported higher percentages for the worse outcome for 930 
the loss and low-value options [Loss: t(105)=5.64, p<.001, d=0.92; Low: t(105)=6.72, 931 
p<.001, d=1.04]. For the gain option, the lower value was judged as more frequent 932 
[t(105)=3.36, p=.001, d=0.47], but there was no reliable difference in judged percent for 933 
the outcomes of the high-value option [t(105)=1.43, p=.155, d=0.24].  934 
Thus, by both memory measures, participants showed consistent biases toward the 935 
extreme lower-value outcomes experienced within each training context, but they did not 936 
show consistent biases toward the extreme higher-value outcomes.  937 
 938 
Figure S5. Results of the two memory tests for each decision context in Experiment 939 
S2. Participants were more likely to report the extreme outcomes first and judged 940 
the lowest outcome in each context as having occurred most frequently. Coloured 941 
bars are local extreme outcomes, and white bars are non-extremes. The colour code 942 
matches the conditions in previous figures (Blue = Loss; Orange = Gain; Red = 943 
Low; Green = High). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 944 
 945 
946 
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Discussion 947 
The choice results show that options providing the same outcomes acquired 948 
different values depending on their grouping with other outcomes and that visually 949 
distinct backgrounds are not necessary for this context effect. Participants were more 950 
risk-seeking for the higher-value options from each context, and they were more risk-951 
seeking for the target choice when it was presented with losses (Context A) than when 952 
that same target choice was presented with higher value outcomes (Context B). The recall 953 
tests also provided some support for the difference in perception of the same choice in 954 
different contexts. In particular, for the risky target option, participants were more likely 955 
to recall the +10 outcome than the +30 outcome for doors trained in Context B (where 956 
+10 was the lowest outcome in the decision set), whereas they did not show higher recall 957 
of +10 than +30 for doors trained in Context A (where it was not an extreme outcome).  958 
The context shift test results support the conclusions of Experiment 2 that context 959 
alters choice by influencing the encoding process. During tests in which the arrangement 960 
of the options changed and feedback was unavailable, participants continued to be more 961 
risk-seeking for target options trained in contexts with other lower-value outcomes. If the 962 
effects were due to retrieval, participants would have had equal risk preferences for 963 
options with the same outcomes (+20 versus +10/+30) during the test phase because they 964 
would have remembered the outcomes from each option according to the context during 965 
retrieval.  966 
